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Funding the Costs of Disease Outbreaks Caused by Non Vaccination
Charlotte A. Moser, Dorit Reiss, Robert L. Schwartz

Introduction
Preventable diseases not only cause suffering and physical harm, they also impose
financial costs on private individuals and public authorities. By disregarding evidence of
the safety and effectiveness of vaccines and choosing not to vaccinate their children some
parents are increasing the risk of outbreaks and their attendant costs. Since nonvaccinating can directly lead to costly outbreaks, this paper argues that it is both fair and
desirable to impose those costs upon those making the choice not to vaccinate. There are,
in fact, strong policy reasons to support doing so regardless of whether we use an
approach-based-fault or a no-fault framework. Not only can the decision not to vaccinate
be seen as culpable, aside from the culpability consideration it is appropriate to compel
those deciding not to vaccinate to internalize the costs in order to prevent free riding and
to mitigate harms to others.
This article addresses the legal tools that can be used to manage the costs associated
with outbreaks, focusing on those that do not require demonstrating fault. In particular,
the article considers the imposition of a fee or a tax on non-vaccinators so that those who
avoid immunization are required to internalize the costs associated with their decisions.

Costs Associated with Non-Vaccination
Widespread use of vaccines has transformed the landscape of medicine. Diseases
that were once significant causes of morbidity and mortality are, in some cases, no longer
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suspected when patients report with symptoms characteristic of these diseases (Chen,
2011; Sugerman, 2010; Calugar, 2006; Lee, 2000). In fact, according to a recent study by
William van Panhuis and colleagues (van Panhuis, 2013), vaccines have prevented about
103 million cases of disease since 1924. Despite the unquestionable effectiveness and
proven safety of vaccines, some parents are concerned enough about the safety of
vaccines that they choose not to have their children vaccinated (Salmon, 2005). While the
number of completely unvaccinated children remains low, pockets of unimmunized
individuals make some communities particularly susceptible to outbreaks (Omer, 2006;
Omer, 2008). In recent years, outbreaks of the most contagious diseases, such as measles
and pertussis, have started to reappear in communities throughout the country (MMWR,
2008; Ortega-Sanchez, 2014; MMWR, 2012). Recent examples include outbreaks of
measles in New York, California, Washington, and Ohio; and one of mumps in Ohio. A
recent press announcements by the CDC stated that the number of measles cases in the
United States in the first half of 2014 was the highest since 1994.
Outbreaks are more likely to occur where pockets of susceptible people cause a
breakdown in herd immunity. Herd immunity results when enough individuals are
immunized, so that the few who are not are still afforded protection. In fact, data have
shown that it is better to be an unimmunized person in a highly vaccinated community
than to be an immunized person in a community of susceptible people (Feikin, 2000; von
den Hof, 2002). because the disease will be less likely to penetrate a highly vaccinated
community, so it is less likely that an unimmunized person will be infected. In contrast,
an infectious agent will spread more readily through a lesser vaccinated population
resulting in infections in both unimmunized individuals as well as those for whom the
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vaccine was not effective. When families choose not to immunize themselves or their
children, discussions often focus on the health consequences that the breakdown in herd
immunity imposes on individuals and society. However, society must also absorb some
of the financial burden related to cases of infectious diseases.
When an individual contracts a preventable disease, the costs are typically covered
by the individual or family, their insurance company or, if they lack private insurance, a
federally funded program, such as Medicare or Medicaid. Individual costs are incurred
for medications (over-the-counter or prescription), co-pays and uncovered procedures or
treatments, and loss of productivity (time at doctor visits or not at work). Several
variables affect these costs, including who in the family is ill, which disease they have,
the severity of illness, and the extent of their private or public medical coverage. Lee and
Pichichero studied costs to families during a pertussis outbreak in New York during
1995-96 and found costs to families were $181 per ill adult, $254 per ill adolescent, $308
per ill child, or $2,822 per ill infant (Lee, 2000). In 2014 US dollars, these costs would
range from $278 - $4,331. While these costs could seem exorbitant to individual families,
they are minor when compared with the lifetime medical costs for an individual who is
permanently harmed as well as the costs associated with stopping the spread of an
infectious disease. Both of which are significantly higher and ultimately absorbed by
society.

Costs associated with permanent harm
While most infectious diseases can lead to permanent harm, rubella and
meningococcal disease may be among the worst. For example, a pregnant woman
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infected with rubella may miscarry, deliver early, suffer a spontaneous abortion or
stillbirth, or have a child born with congenital rubella syndrome (CRS). Children affected
by CRS can suffer deafness, heart or eye damage, mental retardation, skeletal damage,
autism, or some combination of these. If the child survives, the cost to care for the child
over his or her lifetime is estimated to be about $143,000 (2014 US dollars; Babigumira,
2013). Likewise, about 10-20 percent of the people who survive meningococcal infection,
which can cause bloodstream infection (sepsis) or meningitis, will have permanent
consequences such as deafness, limb amputations, or neurologic disabilities. Costs
associated with acute disease and lifetime medical costs for these individuals have been
estimated to range from $87,261 for deafness to $253,723 for someone with multiple
amputations (2014 US dollars; Shepard, 2005). Most of the costs associated with
permanent harm caused by an infectious disease are absorbed by the family and its
insurer. Because private insurers base their fee structures on calculated risks, costs
associated with permanent harm are passed on to participants through premiums. For
those insured through public programs, such as Medicare or Medicaid, costs associated
with permanent harm are absorbed by tax payers.

Costs associated with containment measures
When an infectious disease is identified, one of the most pressing concerns becomes
stopping the spread to others. Containment measures include limiting exposure of
infected individuals to others who may be susceptible; identifying those who were
exposed; monitoring for additional cases; establishing diagnostic testing and preventive
or treatment measures, such as vaccine clinics; alerting and updating healthcare providers
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and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); and addressing the public and
the media (Ortega-Sanchez, 2014). A measles outbreak in 2005 showcases the
complexities (Parker, 2006):
When an unvaccinated six year old was hospitalized with measles in
Illinois, public health officials in that state traced the child’s exposure to
a church gathering of 500 people two weeks prior – in Indiana. When
the Indiana health department began investigating, they identified the
source case as an unvaccinated teenager who had returned from a
church-mission trip. Despite symptoms of illness, she attended the
church gathering where she not only directly infected the hospitalized
child, but also seventeen others attending the gathering and one other
person during a visit with a neighbor (19 first generation infections). In
addition, thirteen additional people were infected by close (household)
contact with the 19 directly infected individuals (second generation
infections). Public health officials attempted to contact the 500 picnic
attendees as well as anyone in contact with what ultimately became 34
people infected over three generations of spread. Workers had to
ascertain vaccination status of attendees, attempt to identify additional
cases, and try to get unvaccinated individuals vaccinated. Containment
activities involved “ninety-nine public health officers and infectioncontrol personnel working in 12 health departments and health care
facilities. . . .”(p.449). These personnel reported 3,650 hours of work,
4,800 telephone calls, 5,500 miles driven, and 550 lab samples to
contain the outbreak started by a single unvaccinated teen returning from
travel.

The cost of containment for public health authorities was $62,216. The total cost of
the outbreak was over two hundred thousand dollars (see Table 1).
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While the aforementioned outbreak started at a church gathering, outbreaks can
begin anywhere that people gather. For example, in 2000, a measles-infected traveler
exposed 335 passengers on a plane (Lasher, 2004). Although passengers were alerted of
the potential exposure on the plane, public health officials decided to follow-up with
additional information the next day leading them to track down passengers at hotels, in
tour groups and by telephone. In this case 97 percent of the passengers were residents of
Japan, two percent were U.S. citizens and 1 percent was from Indonesia.
Likewise, a measles outbreak in Pennsylvania in 2007 was associated with an
international youth sporting event (Chen, 2010). The index case was an international
participant in the sporting event who was ill during travel. Because he was staying in a
residential compound associated with the event, eight U.S. teams and eight international
teams as well as their coaches and event staff were potentially exposed. Likewise, people
on the child’s two flights were exposed as were nine corporate representatives working
the event. One of these nine representatives got measles, but not before traveling to Texas
and visiting three college campuses before being diagnosed. Two college students were
infected by this corporate representative. In total, seven cases occurred (including the
index case) and 1,250 people were potentially exposed in California, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Texas.
Because each situation is different, the extent of and need for containment measures
varies. In addition, the responsibility for and distribution of the financial burden of
associated with containment may also vary. For example, in 2008 a measles-infected
traveler visited a hospital resulting in an additional 13 cases, most of which were
acquired by others in the hospital at that time or secondary cases related to those people.
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Costs to that hospital were estimated to be around $632,084 ($695,993 in 2014 US); most
of which was related to wages and salaries of furloughed workers (Chen, 2011). In
contrast, when a refugee entered the US while infected with measles in 2010,
containment measures were spearheaded by the state public health department, but also
involved personnel from the local public health and refugee departments, CDC, and
hospital personnel. While the containment succeeded in stopping the spread of measles to
others, the $25,000 ($26,818 in 2014 US dollars) costs associated with this single case
fell completely to the government (Coleman, 2012).
Paying the costs associated with infectious diseases	
  
While the government supports public health, the annual budget does not typically
garner large percentages of the whole. For example, of the $973.6 billion in the FY14
federal budget, only $4.6 was earmarked for public health (US Government Spending,
2014), and a recent report by Trust for America’s Health called for increases in core
funding at all levels of public health after presenting data showing that variability in
health statistics between states was related to variation in funding (Trust, 2013). In
addition, public health departments are not funded for unexpected events, which means
that during an outbreak caused by an infectious disease, departments may need to
reassign staff and reallocate funds to complete containment measures in a timely manner
(Ortega-Sanchez, 2014). A 1995 outbreak in Minnesota is instructive (Osterholm, 2001):
Nine cases of invasive meningococcal disease with one death and seven
cases of streptococcal disease with four deaths occurred over a one
month period during the winter of 1995 in Minnesota. The cases
occurred in two towns and were coincident with influenza season
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thereby complicating diagnoses in those presenting with respiratory
symptoms. Containment measures included immunizing 30,000
residents; 26,000 of whom were vaccinated over a 4-day period. Public
health staff worked 18-hour days for more than 23 days; in all, more
than 600 people were involved in the public health response. Costs of
vaccine alone were $1.2 million ($1.8 million 2014 US dollars). The
state health department’s budget for that year was $2.2 million ($3.4
million 2014 US dollars). While the state legislature provided an
emergency appropriation for vaccine costs, the local hospital, which had
to set up a separate emergency area, was never reimbursed.
Table 1 summarizes studies of costs associated with investigating and containing
recent cases and outbreaks of infectious diseases throughout the US.

Costs and Savings Associated with Vaccination
Recently, researchers at the CDC compared the costs of the vaccination program
with the costs savings over the lifetime of a single birth cohort (Zhou, 2014). Using the
2009 US recommended immunization schedule and a hypothetical U.S. birth cohort of
more than 4.2 million children, the researchers calculated estimated cases of disease and
deaths as well as the direct and societal costs associated with the diseases,
immunizations, and net differences. Direct costs included inpatient and outpatient visits
as well as outbreak control; indirect costs included loss of productivity and premature
death. In addition to preventing about 42,000 deaths and 20 million cases of disease,
vaccines were estimated to save about $14.7 billion (2014 US dollars) in direct costs and
$75 billion (2014 US dollars) in societal costs over the lifetime of the cohort.
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Costs of Outbreaks in the Eyes of the Law
The costs associated with outbreaks are unquestionably substantial and many
constitute legally compensable damages. For example, direct costs of a tortious act are
compensable and, in a case concerning a preventable infectious disease, may include the
costs of treating current cases and preventing further ones. In addition, when an
individual has been afflicted with an infectious disease their costs may include lost
earnings, future lost earnings (losing the ability to work generally or to work in specific
types of jobs), physical and emotional pain and suffering (as allowed by the particular
state), and subsequent decrease in life expectancy. Additional relevant costs are costs
associated with inability to perform household tasks. If the afflicted individual dies as a
result of the disease, relatives of the individual can sue for wrongful death, and for the
harm they suffered as a result of the loss, including economic contributions that
individual would have made, lost value of services, and loss of companionship.
Individuals may also recover for pain and suffering, including physical pain and
emotional harm accompanying a physical injury or illness (though some states limit pain
and suffering awards in some or all contexts).

In some rare cases, where behavior is

especially culpable, for example, intentionally exposing a child to chickenpox, punitive
damages may also be appropriate.

The Justification for Recouping Costs
Whether it is appropriate to compel an individual to bear the costs associated with
the decision to not vaccinate is an important starting point to this discussion. It is
especially important in terms of those costs generally imposed on the public purse and
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financed through taxation for the benefit of all. Sometimes, society does pay for
problematic choices made by individuals. For example, individuals are generally not
required to pay for police activity caused because they got into a dangerous situation.
This is not always the case, however. For example, when individuals tortuously cause
damages to public property, they are responsible for the damages even though the
property has been purchased and maintained with public funds (Pennsylvania v. Gen.
Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Whether we use a fault or a no fault basis, there are powerful public policy reasons
to compel those choosing not to vaccinate to bear the costs associated with their actions
(Caplan, 2012 #4148).

A Fault-Based Argument for Recouping Costs
Not vaccinating is, arguably, at least negligent. As mentioned above, the risks of
vaccinating are substantially smaller than the risks of not vaccinating (Calandrillo, 2004)
As a result, vaccination is supported by the overwhelming majority of doctors, scientists
and policy makers. Both from a risk/benefit analysis and through a community norm lens,
the failure to vaccinate is problematic. The justifications for not vaccinating are often
based on information that is simply incorrect (Kennedy, Brown et al. 2005). In truth,
modern anti-vaccine arguments are surprisingly similar to those used in the early days of
vaccines, and are no better supported by evidence today than they were in the 19th
century or the early 20th (Offit 2010).
Unlike intentional torts, negligence does not require actual knowledge that one’s
understanding of the risks is wrong or that one is making a risky choice. As long as the

	
  

10	
  

Moser,	
  Reiss,	
  Schwartz	
  Funding	
  Costs;	
  Draft,	
  do	
  not	
  cite	
  or	
  quote	
  without	
  permission	
  of	
  authors	
  
3	
  June	
  2014	
  

decision maker should have known that the decision was unreasonable, then the decision
is negligent. Given the scientific consensus supporting vaccines, the abundant
information from reputable sources supporting immunization, and the problematic
sources relied upon by those who choose not to vaccinate, it is easy to support the claim
that those who choose not to vaccinate should know they are making an unreasonable
choice. As is the case here, when an individual engages in behavior that free rides on
others, puts others at risks, and is unreasonable or even reckless, there is strong
justification to require the individual to internalize the costs of that behavior.

A No Fault-Based Argument for Recouping Costs
An argument can be made that the choice not to vaccinate is not always negligent.
In reality, the reason for failing to vaccinate children is rarely the result of parents
forgetting to bring children to the pediatrician or the pediatrician’s failure to remember to
provide the vaccination. Rather, failure to vaccinate is occasionally the result of
intentional actions based on serious religious or philosophical principles or is the result of
safety concerns. In most cases, we do not categorize principle-based decisions as
“negligent,” even when most of the society rejects the same principles. For example, the
law does not characterize a woman’s decision to carry a pregnancy to term and not to
have an abortion following a negligently performed tubal ligation as a negligent failure to
mitigate damages. Because there is sufficiently widespread support for an individual
woman’s right to choose to have a baby or choose to have an abortion, no court has ever
declared that choosing one option over the other is negligent. Similarly, Jehovah’s
Witnesses generally are not found to be negligent for refusing medically necessary blood
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transfusions on religious grounds, even though the vast majority of the society rejects
their religiously based principle.1 Whether we are willing to declare a parent to be
negligent for failing to vaccinate a child may be a harder question, but it involves the
same considerations, especially when it is done for religious reasons. A case can be made
based in part on the reasoning in Prince v. Massachusetts, that parents cannot use their
religious principles to endanger a child’s health (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166-67 (1944)). In fact, some jurisdictions have applied a recklessness standard and
convicted parents for manslaughter when the reasons underlying decisions that led to a
child’s death were religious (Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993);
State v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159 (Wash. App. 1991)). This conclusion is not, however,
obvious, nor is it consistent with the prevailing view of negligence in the tort context.
The second alternative, deciding not to vaccinate based upon ill-founded safety
concerns, is more obviously akin to negligence. Acting according to your best judgment
but choosing a larger risk can be negligent (Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490
(C.P.) (1837) (“[W]hether the Defendant had acted honestly and bona fide to the best of
his own judgment . . . would leave so vague a line as to afford no rule at all . . . . [Because
the judgments of individuals are . . . ] as variable as the length of the foot of each . . . we
ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a
man of ordinary prudence would observe”)). Sincere belief that your choice is the correct
one does not make it any less negligent when it imposes risks on others. Even in those
cases, however, a court may find for the defendant on the basis that an error of judgment
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One court has been willing to reduce damages for a plaintiff who agree to forgo blood transfusions and
subsequently suffered greater injury because she could be provided blood, but that was justified by some
version of the doctrine of assumption of the risk rather than contributory or comparative negligence
(Shorter v. Drury, 695 P.2d 116 (1985), cert. denied Shorter v. Drury, 474 U.S. 827 (1985)).
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is not always negligent (Reed v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Comp., 188 P. 409 (Wash. 1921)).
Given the abundance of anti-vaccine misinformation on the Internet (Wolfe, 2005) some
judges or juries may find that the decision not to vaccinate was an error on judgment,
rather than a negligent act.
However, even if the decision to forego vaccination is not regarded as negligent,
imposing the cost on the decision maker is justified for a number of reasons. The most
important reason is that the question of childhood vaccination imposes unusual pressures
upon parents which can be analogized to the prisoner’s dilemma, whereby it is in the
interest of each individual to make a decision that will undermine the social interest of all
of the decision makers. Assuming that there is substantial value in herd immunity and
that there are some adverse side effects of immunization that cannot be controlled, each
individual child would be better off if that child were not vaccinated (so she would avoid
any risk of side effects) and every other child were vaccinated (giving the one
unvaccinated child the protection of herd immunity). In other words, there are some
circumstances where virtually everyone else in the community is vaccinated – in which
parents would be acting rationally in deciding not to vaccinate their children, as long as
their only consideration is the health of that child. In these cases, people would rely –
intentionally or not - on others to protect them or their children against diseases rather
than take the small risk vaccines pose. In other words, they would be free riding on herd
immunity (Fine, 2011).
This situation can also be analogized to the tragedy of the commons, where a
common good is put at risk by individuals acting in their own self-interest. Here the
commons – the disease free state of an immunized community – is put at risk by people
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who depend upon that commons for their own benefit. While people sought to opt out of
vaccination from the earliest days of immunization for the same reasons that are now
advanced, this problem was not so severe when parents often saw children who were
harmed by the diseases we vaccinate against and understood the risks facing their own
children. Today, few parents have ever seen these conditions and, as a result, most do not
fully understand the potentially terrible consequences of these preventable diseases. On
the other hand, stories of vaccine injuries, most of which, like the claim that vaccines
cause autism, are not based on credible medical evidence are advanced by anti-vaccine
movements, and may easily scare parents.
Regardless of whether a parent’s decision to forego vaccination is made as a
conscious decision to “hide in the herd,” or is based upon an incorrect belief that their
children are not really at risk from preventable diseases or that the risks of vaccines are
greater than those of the diseases, in all of these cases the parents’ decisions not to
immunize threaten both the social consensus on vaccination and the herd immunity on
which they rely. We can justify imposing costs upon these parents both as a deterrence
mechanism, which may force them to consider the costs associated with their decisions,
and as a matter of fairness, to prevent them from forcing others to pay for the risks
created by their decisions.
From a public policy perspective, not vaccinating imposes avoidable costs on
government which lead to decreased funding for other important public health programs.
Not vaccinating also increases the risk of outbreak to the community by undermining
herd immunity. Imposing costs upon those who choose not to vaccinate can help deter
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individuals from making such problematic choices without limiting their autonomy with
a vaccination mandate.
One possible claim is that by allowing school immunization requirements, the
legislature had provided a right not to vaccinate and therefore imposing costs is
inappropriate. Even if our proposal was focused on common law suits, we believe that
claim unjustified: exemptions from school immunization requirements balance public
health with parental rights in the context of the child’s education, considering the
importance of education for children. There is no indication that in passing them the
legislature considered the question of the cost of harms from non-vaccination. Further,
acting legally is not always acting reasonably, and costs are imposed, under our system,
for acts that are legal but not reasonable when those acts harm others (Reiss, 2014). But
since our remedy is a statutory one, this is not a problem: in the same way that the
legislature can choose to provide or not provide an exemption, the legislature may impose
costs on those using exemptions.

Legal Tools for Imposing Costs
There are four general types of mechanisms for imposing costs. While this article
briefly mentions all of them, only the fourth will be explored in detail. The first and most
coercive mechanism, is the use of criminal law.

For example, in Jacobson v.

Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a state can impose a fine
for failure to obtain an immunization against a communicable disease that the state
reasonably believes is threatening the community (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 25-27 (1905)). The criminal approach assumes that those who do not receive
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vaccinations have an even higher level of culpability than negligence. Because the
possibility of imposing costs through criminal law liability is a subject that deserves its
own treatment, it is not explored in this article.
The second mechanism is the use of the coercive power of the law to condition
social activities on vaccination without formally invoking criminal law.

Today we

enforce mandatory vaccination policies primarily through attendance at school (or, in
some states, only public school). It makes a great deal of sense to use school attendance
as the conditioning factor because of the importance of immunizing children and the
potential for contagion at schools. On the other hand, there are additional activities that
could be dependent upon vaccination, too. For example, the use of public meeting places
likes parks, pools and water parks, government buildings, theaters, sporting venues,
shopping centers, and other public accommodations could each be conditioned on the
vaccination of the people using it although, admittedly, enforcing these restrictions could
prove challenging and people may resist the requirement to carry evidence of their
vaccination status whenever they are in public. Like mandatory vaccination for school
attendance policies, these other vaccination requirements could allow for vaccination optouts or could be enforced only when particular legally identified circumstances occur.
For example, they could be enforced only when there is an outbreak of a disease or the
vaccination level in the community falls below herd immunity levels.
The third mechanism is to allow suits in negligence for non-vaccination. This
possibility, and its challenges, have been discussed elsewhere (Caplan, 2012; Reiss,
2014). However, bringing a negligence case is not easy; even meritorious cases may be
difficult for plaintiffs to win because there may be substantial problems in proving
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causation, and because they will need to overcome the duty hurdle. In addition, on a
social level, negligence actions are a highly inefficient way to resolve disputes, in large
part because the cost of enforcing an obligation through the use of negligence law is very
high. So while this approach provides an option, it is likely that other more effective and
efficient legal devices are available to encourage vaccination and properly distribute the
cost of the failure to vaccinate.
The fourth alternative mechanism for imposing costs, and the one this article
examines in depth, is a no-fault approach that seeks to force every person who opts out to
internalize the cost of the failure to vaccinate so that the one who incurs the cost is the
one who bears it. The no-fault approach would cause those who decide against
vaccination to internalize the cost of that decision by imposing a tax, fee, premium or
other cost equal to the actuarially based cost of avoiding the immunization. Like the
Arizona Stupid Motorist Act, or similar statutes allowing for the collection of rescue
costs for lost hikers and skiers, or like the federal Superfund administered by the EPA,
which is based on ordinary principles of negligence, the justifications for putting such a
scheme in place to impose costs associated with the failure to vaccinate may draw on the
culpability of the action.

Alternatively, efforts to impose costs may be more like

governments’ attempts to collect the direct costs of their services like city trash collection
fees (where the fees collected must actually cover the costs of trash collection) or bridge
tolls (where the toll is priced to cover bond payments on the bridge and operating
expenses). Cost imposition may have some of the attributes of congestion pricing, like
the costs being imposed on drivers of cars that enter central London or demand-based
parking pricing in San Francisco, where the price goes up as the number of users (in our
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case, non-vaccinators) goes up, increasing the cost to society. Imposition of costs could
also be analogous to the “headless motorcycle rider” statutes being suggested in some
states where the fee to register a motorcycle that could be driven by someone without a
helmet would reflect the additional costs to society of that risk (estimated to be between
$600 and $1000 each year above the regular registration fee). While some of the costs of
these actions are already internalized (after all, non-vaccinators’ children may acquire
these diseases) without an effective legal intervention, many of the costs associated with
communicable diseases are imposed on vaccinated members of society or those who
cannot be vaccinated.
The mechanisms discussed here all probably require a legislative change.

No-Fault Tools for Covering the Costs Associated with Non-Vaccinating
Ex Ante Tools: Taxes, Fees or Costs
One way to manage the problem of the costs of non-vaccinating is to impose the
costs of the choice not to vaccinate upfront, ex-ante (before the fact). In other words, we
can make those who do not vaccinate pay a certain sum to the public purse or insurance
companies to cover costs imposed by the outbreak they cause before an outbreak ever
happens. This approach has the advantage of supplying the money in advance, of
distributing the costs of the risk they create among the entire non-vaccinating population,
and of absolving the government from showing causation. It can, however, run into
implementation problems, including the difficulty of assessing an appropriate amount, of
identifying non-vaccinating parents and collecting the money. It also imposes costs on
those who may never actually cause an outbreak. In a sense, this approach makes the
non-vaccinating pay for the risk they create, not for costs they impose.
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There are many ways in which such fees, taxes or costs could be assessed and
imposed.

As noted earlier, currently the most common mechanism for assuring

childhood immunization in the United States is the requirement that parents provide proof
of vaccination at the time of their children’s school registration. Current law in all states
allows parents to opt out of vaccination for their children when it is medically prudent to
do so, and the law in all but two states permits parents to opt out for other reasons,
including religious, philosophical or personal objections. Thus, the least disruptive way
to have parents internalize the cost of failing to vaccinate their children may be to impose
an opt out fee equal to the actual cost to all of society of having another child
unvaccinated. This fee might vary by locality, by incidence of disease, or by the number
of others who have opted out. As the number of whooping cough cases increases, for
example, the opt out fee could increase; as the number of people opting out of whooping
cough immunization increases, the opt out fee could increase. The need for flexibility and
the fact that fees will vary according to circumstances, suggests that the fee should be
determined by an administrative agency rather than by legislation, potentially in a manner
similar to the assessment of utilities rates. For example, states use Public Utility
Commissions to periodically determine energy rates. While rate setting is complex, states
are accustomed to grappling with this challenge and could apply their experience to nonvaccination as well. Furthermore, using commissioners appointed for fixed, lengthy
terms, ideally with expertise in related fields, can help isolate the process from political
pressures.
While Jacobson held that the right to opt out for medical reasons was
Constitutionally protected by the due process clause, all other opt outs could be assessed
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a consistent fee because, regardless of their different underlying reasons, these decisions
impose the same cost on society. When transferring these costs to those who decide not to
vaccinate, the state would be making a purely economic determination devoid of moral
judgment and without evaluation of the sincerity or honesty of the parents. In fact, the
statute creating the scheme would determine which opt out factors may be considered.
Of course, an opt out fee is not the only way that parents could be effectively
required to internalize the costs they impose on others by failing to vaccinate their
children. The cost could be assessed as a tax payable along with income or other taxes to
the federal government or the state, or those who do vaccinate themselves and their
children could be given tax credits (Parkins, 2012). Alternatively, cash grants or benefits
could be provided to families in which everyone is vaccinated. Politically, it is easier to
allow for tax credits and deductions than to impose penalties, although behavioral
research suggests that the incentive value of a penalty is greater than the incentive value
of a credit or deduction, even when the formal economic value of each is the same.

The actuarial work required to determine the appropriate cost of an opt-out and the
collection of any such fees could be effectively delegated to private instead of a public
agencies, as well. For example, one of the primary costs of failure to vaccinate is the
medical cost incurred by the unvaccinated person. Currently, the ACA allows for health
coverage premiums to be rated on only four grounds:

(1) age, (2) geography, (3)

smoking status, and, sometimes, (4) participation in wellness programs. Vaccination
status could be an additional rating factor used in policies recognized under the ACA
(and, presumably, other policies as well). In fact, the decision to have a vaccination, like
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the decision to have a blood pressure measurement done, could be considered evidence of
participation in a wellness program. Anyone can participate in a vaccination program,
and anyone can succeed without reference to their health status; thus, a program offering
vaccinations to those who for whom they are medically appropriate would seem to meet
the requirements for ACA recognized wellness programs.

Those who do not get

recommended immunizations without a medically valid reason, though, would be subject
to higher monthly insurance premiums and would be forced to internalize at least a part
of the costs of the failure to vaccinate (Lobel and Amir, 2011).

The Public Use of Revenue Raised from Taxes and Fees Imposed on NonVaccination
A tax or fee might be used to raise general revenue for the government, but a tax on
failure to vaccinate may be seen as harsh and unfair to those who have made religiously
or philosophically driven decisions to avoid vaccination. There may be far greater public
support for a tax or fee that is designated for particular purposes related to the failure to
vaccinate. For example, the revenue can be used to pay the cost of vaccinations, the cost
of tracing the source of communicable diseases, the cost of caring for those who are
injured by the failure to vaccinate, the cost of public and professional education about
immunization, and the pain and suffering of those who could not protect themselves
against the underlying diseases. If a state decides to use a no-fault mechanism to impose
the cost of non-vaccination on those who should bear it, it would make political and
economic sense to direct the resources to a fund to be used for that purpose.
Every tax, fee or other incentive with regard to immunization will have to be
consistent with the Constitutional limitations of the due process clauses of the Fifth and
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Fourteenth Amendments, and with the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Since
the United States Supreme Court approved the imposition of criminal penalties against
those who refused locally mandated vaccinations for other than medical reasons a century
ago, it is hard to question the general validity of such laws. Indeed, if criminal penalties
intended to compel compliance are justifiable, then the imposition of other fees and taxes
that are related to the actual cost of noncompliance seem likely to be Constitutionally
sound.
Since the Supreme Court upheld the state use of mandatory school attendance law
to enforce vaccination laws in Zucht v. King, it has been clear that a state can enforce its
immunization requirements through school registration requirements (Zucht v. King, 260
U.S. 174 (1922)). Because Jacobson was decided before the First Amendment was
applied against states, there may still be a free exercise clause argument against requiring
vaccinations that are contrary to religious principles. On the other hand, limitations put
on free exercise claims to exemptions from generally applicable laws in the Smith case
(1991) strongly suggest that such arguments will not be successful, at least under current
law. The United States Constitution is unlikely to hinder any state action imposing a tax,
fee, penalty, or any other cost on someone who does not arrange for vaccinations required
by law without having a medical excuse.

Ex Post: Billing by Public Health Authorities
An alternative to an ex-ante approach is to allow the public health authority to
recoup their costs after the fact by sending a bill to a family whose decision not to
vaccinate caused the outbreak. This approach has the advantage of adhering to traditional
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principles of causation, and prevents the problem of determining and implementing a fee
or tax structure by connecting the amount collected to the harm caused. It has the
disadvantages of requiring proof of causation – not always easy – and of placing the
entire cost on one family or a few families rather than distributing it across all nonvaccinating individuals, making that family bear the costs associated with a choice made
by many, regardless of their ability to bear the cost.
While this approach draws on tort principles of individual responsibility and
causation, it creates a public law remedy.
Under the Free Public Services Doctrine, municipalities cannot recoup costs of
services needed because of a citizen’s negligence absent a statute (Krauss, 2006; Lytton,
2002). The most compelling rationale for this controversial doctrine is that part of
government’s role is to provide services to the public financed via taxation that spreads
the costs to all citizens (Lytton, 2002). Deciding how to allocate the costs of providing
services should be left to the democratically elected legislature, as a matter of public
policy, not to the courts (32 A.L.R. 6th 261; Krauss, 2006). We are unsure if this doctrine
bars recovery in this instance; however, we believe that there is a case for allowing the
courts to recoup these costs under a public nuisance doctrine, by analogy, especially since
many states and municipalities have public nuisance statutes that can provide the
statutory basis the Free Public Services Doctrine requires. See, for example, Cincinnati v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (holding that a city's allegation that
the negligent conduct of the handgun manufacturers, trade associations, and handgun
distributor, relating to the manufacture and distribution of firearms, involved continuing
misconduct and stated a claim for recoupment of costs of government services, such as
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police, emergency, health, corrections, and prosecution services under a public nuisance
theory); A lead paint case awarding damage on a series of public nuisance (California v.
Atl. Richfield Co., 2014 WL 280526 (Cal.Super.)).
But handling the problem via a statutory scheme of some kind has substantial
advantages. For example, it would allow the polity to decide, via the democratic process,
on the terms for imposing such liability and the process for handling it. In addition, it
would offer the opportunity to create a more streamlined and efficient administrative
process rather than requiring an adversarial one. For those reasons, we propose a statute
that will create a mechanism for recouping the costs of outbreak caused by nonvaccinating.

Potential Models: Existing Statutes Imposing Costs
Statutes imposing costs of public services on citizens exist in a variety of contexts
(see Table 2). Several states have statutes allowing the state to recoup the costs of
environmental hazards. For example, agencies may recoup the costs of handling fires
(Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 76.04.495 (West 2014); Cal. Health & Saf. Code §13009 et
seq. (West 2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 106-947 (West 2014)) or hazardous spills (Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 459.537 (2), (3) (West 2014); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 46.03.822 (West
2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 166A-27 (West 2014)). States and municipalities also have
statutes allowing recovery in damages for nuisance. Nuisance can be defined broadly –
for example, California law defines it as “Anything which is injurious to health,
including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere
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with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free
passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream,
canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” (Cal. Civ.
Code § 3479 (West 2014)). Most examples relate to inadequate property management
that causes harm to others (see, e.g. Sacramento City Code 8.04.100 available at:
http://qcode.us/codes/sacramento/) though the principle can be seen as broad enough to
encompass non-vaccination. While that is not the focus of this article, it is certainly a
possibility.
In addition to requiring property owners and others causing environmental hazards
to internalize the costs of their choices, these laws also reflect a value judgment. In
particular, they support the idea that the public should not have to pay for the costs of
those behaviors. They can also help deter such problematic behavior by imposing costs
on the actors. This the same logic we wish to apply to non-vaccination.
Finally, a small number of states have statutes addressing recovery of costs spent on
rescuing an individual from a dangerous situation created by the individual’s own
negligence. For example, the Arizona Stupid Motorist Act (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28910 (West 2014)) allows non-profit and public entities to collect costs expended in
rescuing a driver who, ignoring barricades (or otherwise behaving recklessly), drives a
vehicle onto a public street or highway that is temporarily covered by floodwaters.
Similarly, North Carolina has a statute that allows government agencies to recover costs
incurred in rescuing someone during an emergency if the person rescued ignored a
warning (N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 166A-19.62 (West 2014)). The logic behind these
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statutes is that if the need for public assistance was brought about by an individual’s
highly culpable behavior, then the individual should reimburse the public purse.
Drawing on these existing models, we propose a statute that imposes the costs on
those whose choice to note vaccinate caused them. The statute follows the logic
embodied in existing recovery statutes, and draws heavily on the Arizona statute for its
specifics.
Bill Text:
Title of Bill: Recovering Costs of Outbreaks Caused by Non-Vaccinating
SECTION 1: A person whose decision not to vaccinate herself or a minor
under her control caused or contributed to an outbreak of an infectious
disease is liable for the costs incurred by public agencies in containing and
treating the disease if:
(a) Vaccination of said individual and/or minor against the disease is
recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP).
(b) The individual chose to forgo said vaccination for non-medical
reasons.
(c) Vaccination of the individual and minor would, more likely than not,
have prevented the outbreak.
In considering which costs, if any, to impose on that individual, the
agency will consider:
1. How contagious the disease is.
2. The rate of complications imposing long-term costs from the disease.
3. The difficulty of investigating the disease.
4. Other equities, such as objective difficulties in obtaining a vaccine or
getting a child vaccinated.
SECTION 2: violation of section 1 is a public nuisance.
SECTION 3: The agency or agencies responsible for containing and
managing the outbreak will determine that the requirements above are
fulfilled, assess the costs of investigation, containment and treatment and
provide the liable party with a reasoned decision and an itemized bill.
Once provided, the charge constitutes a debt of that person and may be
collected proportionately by the public agencies that incurred the
expenses.
SECTION 4: An individual determined by the agency or agencies to be
liable under Sections 1 and 2 may appeal the decision to impose costs, and
such an appeal will be heard by a hearing officer in the billing agency or
in the state’s Department of Health (in the case of a private entity)
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according to the procedures enumerated in §556-557 of the Administrative
Procedures Act or the state equivalent. The agency’s final decision may be
appealed to the state’s courts.
SECTION 5: The State Department of Health will have the authority to
promulgate rules to implement this statute.
SECTION 6: Qualifying for a religious or personal belief exemption under
state law is not a defense against liability.
SECTION 7: A notice of this potential liability will be provided to parents or
patient at each doctor visit in which vaccines should be offered according to the
CDC’s immunization schedule and along with the form used to obtain an
exemption from the state’s immunization requirements.

Discussion
The statute makes not vaccinating a public nuisance and forcing individuals to
internalize those costs. It thus fits comfortably within the ideas of personal responsibility
embodied in our system: individuals are free (subject to other applicable rules, like school
immunization requirements) not to vaccinate themselves or their children. If, however, an
individual’s choice creates risk, then the individual is required to pay for those risks if
they materialize. The specific risk the statute enacts is the costs of outbreaks borne by
those having to contain them. By using principles of nuisance, it justifies liability whether
or not we view not vaccinating as negligent. By requiring causation, it keeps the
principles of justice that justify compensation in other contexts.
The statute’s remedy here is a public law remedy. That means that it needs to
follow public law norms in substance and procedures. The decision must be based on the
appropriate criteria. Procedurally, it must be reasoned and transparent. Once written and
reasoned, allowing the entity seeking reimbursement to collect it as a debt – again,
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following the Arizona statute – makes the initial process of recouping costs more
efficient and streamlined.
The statutes offer the individual a process to challenge the decision via, in the first
instance, an appeal to the public agency. In contrast to the simple, streamlined initial
billing, the appeal process includes full formal adjudicatory procedures as described in
the Administrative Procedures Act (or the state equivalent – for the purposes of the
statute, the Administrative Procedures serves as a model and source of procedures). This
will provide the parties the right to bring witnesses and documents and rights of crossexamination, as far as feasible. By offering an adversarial process, the statute offers the
non-vaccinating party ample opportunity to correct errors in the initial decision. But by
making the first step administrative it assures that the decision will be heard by officials
with expertise in administrative adjudications and prevents adding burden to the courts.
Courts will judicially review the decision if there is further appeal, but will not have to
undertake the initial fact-finding.
In section 5, the statute clarifies that the state’s decision to allow unvaccinated
children to attend school if they obtain an exemption does not relieve the parent making
that problematic choice from having to bear the cost of that choice to the public.
Both fairness and deterrence support providing notice to the individual beforehand
of the potential costs. While individuals are on constructive notice of the law – not
knowing the law is not a defense – it would be more effective and fair to provide
individuals with a direct warning, if possible. Of course, if an individual does not visit a
doctor or apply for an exemption, it may be impossible to alert them, but if there is an
opportunity, they should be put on notice. Section 6 enacts a requirement of notifying the
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individual in two circumstances: during a doctor visit where vaccines are discussed, and
if an individual applies for an exemption.

Conclusion
Not vaccinating has direct costs: beyond a certain level, it can and does increase the
incidence of preventable diseases. Outbreaks, in turn, lead to direct monetary costs that
often cannot be anticipated in advance, both the costs of treating the disease and the costs
of containing it. When those costs come out of the public purse, resources are diverted
from other needs, and important public values can suffer. There is abundant data showing
that modern vaccines are effective and safe, and their small risks are far outweighed by
their tremendous benefits. From this perspective, it is appropriate to require those who
choose not to vaccinate to internalize the costs of that choice, rather than imposing them
on the public. There are several tools available to allow that. We should use them.
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Goal:
Issue:

Appendix	
  B:	
  Table	
  2:	
  Statutes	
  Addressing	
  Cost	
  Recovery	
  	
  
	
  
Agency recovery for costs incurred during response to vaccine
preventable disease outbreaks.
Public cost recovery for action is generally barred the Municipal Cost
Recovery Rule or Free Public Services Doctrine.
In general, courts do not allow state, municipal, or government agencies
to recover in common law for costs expended carrying out public services
from the tort-feasors whose negligent conduct caused the need for those
services. The common-law rule by which the courts are guided in these
instances is the “municipal cost recovery rule” (county, state, or
municipality) or “free public services doctrine” (government agency).
The doctrines (which are used interchangeably by the courts) provide that,
“absent specific statutory authorization or damage to government-owned
property, a government agency, county, state or municipality cannot
recover the costs of carrying out public services from a tort-feasor whose
conduct caused the need for the services.” (32 A.L.R. 6th 261.)
The primary rationale behind the free public services doctrine is that,
absent specific statutory authorization, state legislatures establish local
governments to provide core services for the public and pay for these
services by spreading the costs to all citizens through taxation. That the
question of whether the costs of providing the public service should be
spread among all taxpayers, or reallocated in some other manner,
necessarily implicates fiscal policy, and, therefore, falls within the special
purview of the legislature, not the court. (32 A.L.R. 6th 261.)

Means of
overcoming
a
presumptio
n of Free
Public
Services:
Recovery
Sources:

	
  

Other suggested rationales are that tortfeasors owe government entities no
duty of care that would support recovery, and that the doctrine suggests
that courts should avoid upsetting settled expectations.
Emergency Pubic Nuisance Ordinances
Model
Response
State
Recovery
Emergenc
Statutes,
y Health
e.g.
Powers
Act
Forest Fires: Common law doctrine, qualified by statute
See e.g.,
and ordinances:
Cal. Health see e.g.,
34	
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& Saf. Code
§13009 et
seq.
(authorizing
a California
public
agency
plaintiff to
seek
damages
from tortfeasors
responsible
for
negligently
starting
forest fires);
RCW
76.04.495
(authorizing
Washington
State,
municipaliti
es, and
agencies in
a like
manner to
CA’s
§13009 et
seq.)
-Also note:“Any
person who
personally
or through
another
wilfully,

	
  

CA Cal. Civ. Code §3479 et seq.
of note :
“Anything which is injurious to health,
including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of
controlled substances, or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to
the free use of property, so as to interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property,
or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or
use, in the customary manner, of any
navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or
basin, or any public park, square, street, or
highway, is a nuisance.”
(Cal. Civ. Code § 3479.)
“A public nuisance is one which affects at the
same time an entire community or
neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance
or damage inflicted upon individuals may be
unequal.”
§3480
“Every nuisance not included in the definition
of the last section is private.”
§3481
-however“Nothing which is done or maintained under
the express authority of a statute can be
deemed a nuisance.”
(Cal. Civ. Code § 3482.)
-providing a right of action for recovery for
abatement of a nuisance“An action may be brought by any person
whose property is injuriously affected, or
whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a
35	
  

POWERS
ACT
As of
December
21, 2001
There's
nothing
directly on
point, but it
seems like
there is an
opportunity
for a statute
authorizing
recovery
to be in
thereSpecifically
§§ 803805
- CA has
enacted
§803
- CA had
not enacted
§804 as of
2006,
though
23/28
states
enacting
some
portion of
the
MSEHPA
had.
(note: this
research
may not be
current
through SB
1430
(introduced
2006 by
Sen. Elaine
Alquist), the
Local
Pandemic
and
Emergency
Health
Preparedne
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negligently,
or in
violation of
law, sets
fire to,
allows fire
to be set to,
or allows a
fire kindled
or attended
by him to
escape to,
the property
of another,
whether
privately or
publicly
owned, is
liable to the
owner of
such
property for
any
damages to
the property
caused by
the fire.
(Cal. Health
& Saf. Code
§13007)
and
“Any
person who
allows any
fire burning
upon his
property to
escape to

	
  

nuisance, as defined in Section 3479 of the
Civil Code, and by the judgment in that
action the nuisance may be enjoined or
abated as well as damages recovered
therefor. A civil action may be brought in
the name of the people of the State of
California to abate a public nuisance, as
defined in Section 3480 of the Civil Code,
by the district attorney or county counsel of
any county in which the nuisance exists, or
by the city attorney of any town or city in
which the nuisance exists. Each of those
officers shall have concurrent right to bring
an action for a public nuisance existing
within a town or city . The district attorney,
county counsel, or city attorney of any
county or city in which the nuisance exists
shall bring an action whenever directed by
the board of supervisors of the county, or
whenever directed by the legislative
authority of the town or city.”
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §731

ss Act- I
don’t
believe that
that act
addressed
these
issues, but
it will need
to be
checked
out)
MSEHPA
§803
Financing
and
Expenses
- Nothing
directly on
point, but
this is
where the
structure of
the
financing is
established
(where
money is
coming
from, etc.)

-representative public nuisance ordinancesSacramento: (Sacramento City Code available
at http://qcode.us/codes/sacramento/)
Sacramento City Code 8.04.100 [Nuisances]
Generally
It is unlawful and a misdemeanor and hereby
declared a public nuisance for any person
owning, leasing, occupying or having charge
or possession of any premises in this city to
maintain such premises in such a manner that
any one or more of the conditions or activities
described in the following subsections are
found to exist and allowed to continue:
A. The keeping, storage, depositing, or
accumulation on the premises of any personal
property which is within the view of persons
on adjacent or nearby real property or the
36	
  

§804
Liability
- This is
mostly
granting
immunity,
but there is
relevant
language in
(b)(4):
(a) State
immunity
(creating
State
immunity.)
(b) Private
liability.
((1) – (3)
create
immunities
for private
parties
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the property
of another,
whether
privately or
publicly
owned,
without
exercising
due
diligence to
control such
fire, is liable
to the owner
of such
property for
the damages
to the
property
caused by
the fire.”
(Cal. Health
& Saf. Code
§13008)
Hazardous
spills:
See e.g.,

public right-of-way when such personal
property constitutes visual blight, reduces the
aesthetic appearance of the neighborhood, is
offensive to the senses, or is detrimental to
nearby property or property values. Personal
property includes, but is not limited to, junk
as defined in Section 8.04.090 of this chapter,
abandoned, wrecked, or dismantled
automobiles…
O. Any illegal activity occurring on the
property which is detrimental to the life,
health, safety and welfare of the residents,
neighbors or public. For purposes of this
chapter, illegal activity is defined as any
violation of state or federal law, rules or
regulations, or local ordinance;
Recovery statute example, Sacramento:
Sacramento City Code 8.28.040 Lien or
personal obligation. [referencing weed and
rubbish abatement]
The cost of abatement shall be assessed
against the parcel as a lien or made a personal
obligation of the owner, and may be made a
special assessment, as set forth in Chapter
8.04 of this title.

San Francisco:
NRS 459.53 SF Municipal Code available at
7 (2),
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco
(3) (Nevada .shtml
)
Recovery is authorized for abatement of
(authorizing public health nuisances relating to
municipal
environmental health, including:
or state
• mosquito control and prevention
agency
• mold prevention (pdf)
recovery
• dirty needles
action from
• garbage accumulation
persons
• rodents
responsible
• neglected and overgrown vegetation
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involved in
emergency
response)
-However,
there is
some
language in
(4) that is
relevant:
(4) The
immunities
provided in
this
Subsection
shall not
apply to
any private
person,
firm, or
corporation
or
employees
and agents
of such
person,
firm, or
corporation
whose act
or omission
caused in
whole or in
part the
public
health
emergency
and who
would
otherwise
be liable
therefor.
(Legislative
History.
Section 804
is adapted
from 2001
ILL. LAWS
73(15),
(21).)
§805
Compensat
ion
Deals
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for a leak or
spill of, or
an accident
involving
hazardous
waste,
hazardous
material or a
regulated
substance);
Alaska Stat.
§ 46.03.822
(creating a
strict
liability for
recovery of
costs
associated
with the
spill of
hazardous
substances)
Text
Including:
“the costs of
response,
containment
, removal,
or remedial
action
incurred by
the state, a
municipality
, or a
village, and
for the
additional
costs of a
function or

	
  

stagnant water causing mosquito
breeding
• bird and animal waste
• pigeon nuisance
• safety hazards
• chemical/offensive odors
• too many pets
• unsanitary living conditions, hoarding
• inoperative vehicles on private
property
(http://www.sfdph.org/dph/EH/codeEnforce/d
efault.asp)
•

San Fransisco City Code Art. 11, Sec. 581:
Prohibited Public Health Nuisances
(a) No Person shall have upon any premises
or real property owned, occupied or
controlled by him, or her, or it any public
nuisance.
(b) The following conditions are hereby
declared to be a public nuisance:
(1) Any accumulation of filth, garbage,
decayed or spoiled food, unsanitary debris or
waste material or decaying animal …
(16) Anything else that the Director deems
to be a threat to public health and safety.
Brief analysis of SF:
Note that public health nuisance has been
used in other instances despite the list, for
example the Occupy protestors were declared
a public health nuisance in order to allow the
city to ‘abate’ their presence. (See CBS,
Occupy SF Camp Declared Public Health
Nuisance; Eviction Deadline Passes (nov. 18,
2011)
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/11/18/o
ccupy-sf-camp-declared-public-healthnuisance-eviction-deadline-passes/)
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largely with
those
seeking
compensati
on from the
state
(Legislative
History.
Section 805
is adapted
from Colo.
Rev. Stat.
§24-322111.5)
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service,
including
administrati
ve expenses
for the
incremental
costs of
providing
the function
or service,
that are
incurred by
the state, a
municipality
, or a
village, and
the costs of
projects or
activities
that are
delayed or
lost because
of the
efforts of
the state, the
municipality
, or the
village,
resulting
from an
unpermitted
release of a
hazardous
substance
or, with
respect to
response
costs, the
substantial
threat of an

	
  

Subd. (16) would seem to be fairly open, and
seems to have been used that way (see
Occupy Protestors), however Sec. 581 lists
conditions that are specific to real property,
and use of that subdivision beyond property
conditions would seem to be subject to
challenge on statutory interpretation grounds.
Article 11 continues by providing city
agencies (specifically the Dept. of Public
Heatlth and Police) with the power to inspect
premises (Sec. 595) and provide notice of
violation and the subsequent administrative
action (Secs. 596, 596.5), which includes
orders of abatement and provides that the
Director may abate the nuisance if the owner
does not comply (596, subd. (f)), or if the
nuisance creates an ‘immediate danger to
health or safety’ (596.5, subd. (a)).
Cost recovery, including attorneys fees, for
city abatement is authorized at Sec. 596, subd.
(i)(3) and Administrative fines including cost
recovery are authorized at Sec. 596.5. Sec.
599 further authorizes and details how the
Director shall (shall, not may) ascertain the
administrative costs incurred in abating the
nuisance and details how the costs shall be
collected from the property owner.
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unpermitted
release of a
hazardous
substance”
Reckless
Motorist
(The
Arizona
‘Stupid
Motorist’
Law
(Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 28910 (Lexis
2014)
(creating a
municipal
cost
recovery for
costs
accrued in
rescue
operations
for
motorists
who
intentionally
or
recklessly
ignore
warnings of
flood and
washout
conditions)
Text:
A. A driver
of a vehicle
who drives
the vehicle
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on a public
street or
highway
that is
temporarily
covered by
a rise in
water level,
including
groundwater
or overflow
of water,
and that is
barricaded
because of
flooding is
liable for
the
expenses of
any
emergency
response
that is
required to
remove
from the
public street
or highway
the driver or
any
passenger in
the vehicle
that
becomes
inoperable
on the
public street
or highway
or the
vehicle that
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becomes
inoperable
on the
public street
or highway,
or both.
B. A person
convicted of
violating
section 28693 for
driving a
vehicle into
any area
that is
temporarily
covered by
a rise in
water level,
including
groundwater
or overflow
of water,
may be
liable for
expenses of
any
emergency
response
that is
required to
remove
from the
area the
driver or
any
passenger in
the vehicle
that
becomes
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inoperable
in the area
or the
vehicle that
becomes
inoperable
in the area,
or both.
C. The
expenses of
an
emergency
response are
a charge
against the
person
liable for
those
expenses
pursuant to
subsection
A or B of
this section.
The charge
constitutes a
debt of that
person and
may be
collected
proportionat
ely by the
public
agencies,
for-profit
entities or
not-forprofit
entities that
incurred the
expenses.
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The person's
liability for
the
expenses of
an
emergency
response
shall not
exceed two
thousand
dollars for a
single
incident.
The liability
imposed
under this
section is in
addition to
and not in
limitation of
any other
liability that
may be
imposed.
D. An
insurance
policy may
exclude
coverage for
a person's
liability for
expenses of
an
emergency
response
under this
section.
E. For the
purposes of
this section:
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1.
"Expenses
of an
emergency
response"
means
reasonable
costs
directly
incurred
by public
agencies,
for-profit
entities or
not-forprofit
entities
that make
an
appropriat
e
emergency
response
to an
incident.
2. "Public
agency"
means this
state and
any city,
county,
municipal
corporatio
n, district
or other
public
authority
that is
located in
whole or
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in part in
this state
and that
provides
police, fire
fighting,
medical or
other
emergency
services.
3.
"Reasonab
le costs"
includes
the costs
of
providing
police, fire
fighting,
rescue and
emergency
medical
services at
the scene
of an
incident
and the
salaries of
the
persons
who
respond to
the
incident
but does
not include
charges
assessed
by an
ambulance
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service
that is
regulated
pursuant to
title 36,
chapter
21.1,
article 2.
Notable or
Note that courts are split as to whether or not cost recovery for public
Representat nuisance can overcome the municipal cost recovery rule. (See e.g. City
ive Cases:
of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) P 16241 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying Pennsylvania law), (recognizing
Public
that there is some authority for an exception to the municipal cost
Nuisance
recovery rule, when the public entities are seeking to recover damages for
the costs of abating public nuisances, noting that the municipality must
state a claim for public nuisance, the nuisance must be abatable, and the
damages sought by the municipality must represent the cost of
abatement).
Limiting:
(generally)
Jupin v. Kask 849 N.E. 2d 829 (Mass. 2006) (holding that the estate of a
slain police officer could not bring a public nuisance claim against the
mother of a mentally impaired youth who had shot and killed an the
officer with a gun acquired from the parent’s unlocked gun cabinet, noting
that although “the improper storage of the firearms in her home interfered
with public health morals and safety, and that this interference was a
result of [defendant’s] negligent, reckless, and ultrahazardous conduct”,
there was a “vast gap between this case and traditional public nuisance
cases, such as those involving highways and navigable streams or the
keeping of diseased animals or the maintenance of a pond breeding
malarial mosquitoes”)
Ashley Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 666-69 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying
Arkansas law) (holding that plaintiff counties could not pursue a public
nuisance claim against manufacturers of cold and allergy medications that
contained the primary ingredient for methamphetamine manufacture due
to lack of proximate cause)
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Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, 643 S.E.2d 324, 328-29 (cert.
denied) (Georgia App. 2007) (holding that, where county brought
a negligence and public nuisance action against owners and operators of a
crematorium, and the county sought to recover the expenses it incurred in
recovering, identifying, and properly disposing of bodies found at the
crematorium, that where there was statutory authority providing lien and
recovery of expenses from property owners, the county was barred from
using public nuisance to bring an action for recovery in tort) (further
holding that there is no exception to the free public services doctrine when
the costs are incurred as part of the abatement of a public nuisance since if
such an exception were recognized, it could give rise to substantial
litigation because litigants could re-characterize many expenditures for
public services as expenses incurred in abating a public nuisance)
(lead paint)
State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 443 (R.I. 2008) (holding
that the manufacture and use of lead paint was not a public nuisance
because it had not ‘interfered with a public right.’)
(guns)
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill.
2004), (holding that the municipal cost recovery rule precluded a city and
a county, in a public nuisance action against firearms manufacturers,
distributors, and dealers, from recovering for law enforcement and
medical services expenditures allegedly incurred as a result of gun
violence)
-but seeCincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002)
(holding that a city's allegation that the negligent conduct of the handgun
manufacturers, trade associations, and handgun distributor, relating to the
manufacture and distribution of firearms, involved continuing misconduct
and stated a claim for recoupment of costs of government services, such
as police, emergency, health, corrections, and prosecution services under a
public nuisance theory);
See also, City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d
1222 (Ind. 2003);
James v. Arms Technology, Inc., 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. 2003)
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Notable or
Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, (Alaska
Representat 1999) (holding that a municipality was not barred under the free public
ive Cases:
services doctrine from recovering from an oil vessel owner the costs of
responding to an oil spill where the municipality sought to recover from
Hazardous the owner under state statutes)
waste or
forest fires
Many of the forest fire cases are against utilities and railroads, who have a
duty created by statute (Cal Pub Resources Code § 4293)
See State of California v. Southern Pacific Co., 133 Cal App 3d 862
(reprinted as modified) (1983, Cal App 1st Dist); People v. Southern Cal.
Edison Co. (1976) 56 Cal. App. 3d 593; Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co., 266 Cal App 2d 355 (1968, Cal App 1st Dist)
But it is also applied in other cases of negligence:
See, People ex rel. Grijalva v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1072
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008) (applying §13009 liability to real parties in
interest after a construction company negligently caused a brush fire
which burned 64,000 acres);
People v. Williams, 222 Cal. App. 2d 152, 155 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1963)
(refusing to extend §13009 liability to a property owner when the
negligently caused fire was confined to her own land)
Notable or
The Arizona Stupid Motorist law, Arizona Revised Statute, section 28Representat 910, authorizes both for-profit and public entities to collect costs
ive Cases:
expended in rescuing a driver who drives a vehicle on to a public street or
highway that is temporarily covered by floodwaters. (A.R.S. § 28-190
Arizona
(A).) Public entities include state, city, county, municipal corporation,
‘Stupid
district or public agency, police, fire, or other emergency services.
Motorist’
(A.R.S. § 28-190 (E)(2).) The costs incurred constitute a debt of that
person, and may not exceed $2000. (A.R.S. § 28-190 (C).)
The statute is rarely used, but in order to find a driver liable, the
government must show that the driver either (1) drove around barricades
meant to block off flooded areas, or (2) be charged and convicted for
reckless driving for driving into a flood area even if there are no
barricades. (Alexis Shaw, Arizona Officials Weigh 'Stupid Motorist Law'
for Tour Bus Driver in Flood, ABCNews (July 30, 2013) available at
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http://abcnews.go.com/US/arizona-officials-weigh-stupid-motorist-lawtour-bus/story?id=19817085 (quoting Chief Deputy Mojave County
Attorney Jace Zack).)
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